Introduction
Undoubtedly, initial public offerings (IPOs) have generated an enormous amount of public interest and are one of the most researched areas in finance. Common empiricisms have shown that IPOs are subject to three well documented anomalies, namely, the short-term underpricing of IPOs, the hot issue market phenomenon and the long-run performance of IPOs. With regard to short-term underpricing, issuers offer shares to investors at prices considerably below the subsequently revealed market value. The underpricing of IPOs is anomalous in the sense that it appears to contradict the efficient market's hypothesis. In particular, one would expect the underpricing of IPOs to disappear over time as the devastating majority of investors will recognize the implied profit opportunities and make good use of them. However, the underpricing of IPOs seems to be persistent in most markets. Furthermore, it would be difficult to rationally justify the behavior of living owners to sell shares to outsiders at discounted prices. The fact that these anomalies exist in numerous developed and developing markets makes them even more difficult to explain.
There are a number of theoretical explanations and models underpinning this IPO underpricing. The popular justifications for this observed phenomenon rest upon the possible existence of information asymmetries, mainly in the form of ex ante uncertainties about share prices. Also, according to (Welch, 1989) , (Grinblatt & Hwang, 1989) and other similar studies, there exists a signaling mechanism where firms send signals to the market by underpricing their IPOs. Moreover, there are other possible explanations such as underwriter reputation theories, investor sentiment theories and prospect theories to explain the degree of underpricing in the IPO market.
Role of BSE in Book Building Process
BSE offers the book building services through the book building software that runs on the BSE private network. This system is one of the largest electronic book building networks anywhere spanning over 350 Indian cities through over 7000 trader work stations via leased lines, VSATs and campus LANS. The software is operated through book-runners of the issue and by the syndicate member brokers. Through this book, the syndicate member brokers on behalf of themselves or their clients' place orders. Bids are placed electronically through syndicate members, and the information is collected on line real-time until the bid date ends. In order to maintain transparency, the software gives visual graphs displaying price v/s quantity on the terminals.
Theories and Models of Underpricing
Therefore, a number of competing theoretical models have been developed to explain the initial underpricing of stocks. The main theories found in the IPO literature are the winner's curse hypothesis, bookbuilding theories, and the principal-agent hypothesis, signaling theories, the law-suit avoidance hypothesis, the ownership and control hypothesis and the investor sentiment theory. One of the most important models of underpricing is the one developed by (Rock, 1986) based on the winner's curse hypothesis. Rock distinguishes between informed and uninformed investors. If the issues are underpriced, IPOs will be oversubscribed by informed investors, resulting in a limited number of shares being available to uninformed investors. If the issues are overpriced, IPOs will be sold exclusively to uninformed investors who will earn negative initial returns. Thus, uninformed investors will be winning the entire issue but at an unfavorable price, creating a situation termed the winner's curse. In order to keep uninformed investors in the IPO market, securities are offered at a discount from their expected after market prices. Thus, according to the winner's curse theory, IPO underpricing should decrease if the information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors is reduced.
Empirical studies have found evidence that the underpricing for IPOs of financial institutions is related to proxies for asymmetric information. Signaling (Allen & Faulhaber, 1989) asymmetric information (Ibbotson, 1975) Offer size (Megginson & Weiss, 1991) age of the firm (Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 1989) market capitalization, (McDonald & Fisher, 1972) , (Baker & Wurgler, 2007) , Pricing mechanism determinants of IPO underpricing at BSE . (Leite, 2007) , generalized the informational assumptions of the (Rock, 1986) to address empirical evidence and conjectures that the standard model based on informed and uninformed investors is unable to address. They showed that high (low) market returns induce the issuer to price the issue more conservatively (aggressively) to create a negative relation between the public signal and the quality of the marginal investor, and in turn a positive relation between market returns and underpricing. (Dolvin & Jordon, 2008) , addressed the question of whether or not periods of high underpricing adversely affect pre-existing shareholders. They found that high levels of underpricing are associated with increased share retention, which effectively offsets much of the potential cost. Overall, the percentage of shareholder wealth lost is stable over time, unlike underpricing itself. Also many factors known to be related to underpricing are not significant determinants of the cost of going public to pre-existing owners.
(Kumar, 2010) examines the efficiency of IPO issuing mechanisms using a sample of Indian IPOs that tapped the primary market during 2003-2007 by taking into thoughtfulness the total costs the issuers have to face i.e., including both direct as well as indirect costs. He finds that from a total cost point of view the issuers fare neither better nor worse using either book building or the fixed price offers. Their results also indicated that the issue expenses associated with book building are more than those associated with fixed price offers after controlling for issue size and firm specific characteristics. , analyzes that whatever there is any significant difference in the magnitude of level of underpricing of IPOs that priced through the book build with those are priced through the fixed price option. They found that the magnitude of underpricing is concerned; the book-build and fixed price option gave different results. They found significant difference in level of magnitude of underpricing in IPOs that priced during the book build with those that are priced through the fixed price option. 
Research Methodology

Sample and Data Collection Methods
The sample used in this study consists of all Indian firms which went public on the official market of the Stock Exchange of Bombay for the period April 2000 until 2011. Presume the limited number of firms, we have included those that were delisted during the sample period. The prospectus is used to collect data prior to listing. These include the offer price, issue details, dates and amounts, the sponsoring stockbroker, the auditor, and financial information from balance sheets and income statements. Notwithstanding, for some firms, there is no prospectus and in such cases the annual reports before the year of listing are used to collect ex-ante information. Furthermore, information on the issue details of such firms is manually collected from the Registrar of Companies, which keeps files for all private and public companies in Mauritius. Furthermore, the SEBI Handbook, which provides a 5-year summary of income statements and balance sheets for all listed companies, is also consulted. Moreover, the SEBI Fact book, an annual publication issued by the SEBI to disseminate information to investors, is used to collect information on the main market indicators as well as information pertaining to rights issues and bonus issues by listed companies. In addition, regular price histories were collected for each sample firm through the period 1999-2011. In particular, daily share price data for all sample firms from the listing date up to three years subsequent to listing are obtained from the (SEBI's) own quotes as well as from different stock broking companies.
Measure of Underpricing
Consistent with the standard methodology, underpricing is calculated as the percentage changing from the offer price to the closing price in the secondary market.
Equation 1
  Log underpricing ln P1 P0 P0 100
where P0 = Offer price of the IPOs offered to public, P1= First day closing price of IPOs listed at stock exchange.
 
Log Underpricing ln P1 P0 P0 100    is used to determine the level of underpricing and to make standard practice and to avoid hetroscadisticity. We have market adjusted returns on securities (MAARO).
Firstly, we calculate the return on i security, where we used   Ri P1 P0 P0   in which, Ri = return on i security, P1 = Price of i security on first listing day, P0 = offer price of i security.
Secondly, we calculate index return on corresponding da where we used
Mi Ii I0 I0   in which, Mi = market return on ith day, ex at listing day, I0= closing index at offer day.
Equation 3
Ii = closing ind
e highly volatile ch
If markets ar such that there is a major ange in the price of most stocks during the IPO period, then initial returns should be market adjusted. To compute the first day market adjusted return, the return of the market index is initially calculated as is the closing value of the market index on the issue date corresponding to the offering by firm i and Mi is the value of the market index corresponding to the offering price of the firm i. The market adjusted return abnormal return for each IPO on the first trading day is therefore computed as: MAARO. Finally, we calculate market adjusted return on security, where we take Ri from Equation (2) and Mi from Equation (3).
Equation 4

e measure in Equation (4) However, th mption that the systematic risk of the IPOs under consideration is the same as that of the index. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that the betas of the IPOs average to unity, as a number of studies (e.g., Ibbotson, 1975; Affleck-Graves et al., 1996) have shown that the average betas of the newly listed firms are systematically higher than one. As such, the MAARO may be upwardly biased in the sense that a higher initial performance of the IPO relative to the market could be observed.
Underpricing is used as dependent variable in th gression model. Null Hypothesis een several independent variables with the level of underpricing. The ownership structure of a comp tion of the size of investor shareholdings. Applying a single measure in the form of a proportion is to be sufficient to delineate distributions with varying shapes. Numbers of shares are held by promoters and non promoters. We have also taken the total percentage of their shares holding in the ownership structure. Afterwards we have converted it into the natural logarithms to make standardized value and to remove the hetroscadisticity.
H2: There an promoters and degree of underpricing. H3: There is a positive relationship betwe omoters and the level of underpricing. H4: There is a positive link between non oters and level of underpricing.
Number of share offered is measured b ares that issuing firm has offered to their investors. Afterwards we have transformed it into the natural logarithms to make standardized value and to remove the hetroscadisticity.
H5: There is a positive relationship between number of sha fered and degree of underpricing.
Firm age is measured i ar of IPO and the year of incorporation of the firm.
H6: There is no significant relationship between f d degree of underpricing.
The issue size is measured as the total number of s red multiplied by the offer price. However, the total amount of IPOs (in Crores) rose by the company. Again, the natural logarithm of this value is used as a standard practice and to remove hetroscadisticity.
H7: There is a negative ze and level of underpricing.
The market capitalization is measure ares multiplied by the market price per share. Again, the natural logarithm of this value is used as a standard practice and to remove hetroscadisticity.
H8: There is no significan lizations and less underpricing.
The subscription is measur quired by several investors on the day of offering. Again, the natural logarithm of this value is used as a standard practice and to remove hetroscadisticity.
H9: There is a positive rel vel of underpricing.
In Indian primary market, there are two pricing tech at are used to determine the nature of IPOs i.e. book build pricing mechanism and fixed price option. For the pricing mechanism again a dummy variable is used to indicate the presence of book build in IPO underpricing. The presence of book build pricing mechanism in IPOs is shown with value equal to 1 and 0 otherwise.
H10: There is a negative echanism and level of underpricing.
Past data revealed that IPOs issuing company is in two . some are government companies and some are private companies. Therefore, to analyze the difference between IPOs underpricing and the nature of company types, we used measures of types of firms as a variable in our model. For the measures of the firm's types, again a dummy variable is used to indicate the presence of private firms in IPOs underpricing. The presence of private firms in IPOs is shown with value equal to 1 and 0 otherwise. H11: Ther anism and level of underpricing. The impact of the independent variable rate, issue size, market capitalization, of mber of share offered, private firms (dummy), ownership structure, IPOs years (dummy) and pricing mechanism (dummy) by book build option on the dependent variable underpricing is modeled through multiple regression as:
Estimation Equation
Underpricing ( which (234) IPOs were underrpric us g fix d pri optio Tab clud some abbreviations such as, BSE (Bombay stock exchange), BB (Book building pricing mechanism), FPO (Fixed price option), BB-Under (IPOs underpricing using book building), BB over (IPOs overpricing using book building), FPO under (Details of IPOs underpricing using fixed price option underpricing), FPO over (IPOs overpricing using fixed price option). Table 2 indicates the descriptive results for all the variab that are used in our regres (book building), different Os, ownership structure, issue size and market capitalization of the firm's. Nevertheless, we used mean, median, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis and Jarquebera test for normality. Results reveal the maximum mean value (6.46) & (3.48) for market capitalization and issue size respectively and standard deviation (2.18) for market capitalization. Figure 1 exhibits the mean and standard values for all the variables that are used in regression model i.e. Pricing mechanism (book building), different IPOs years, fir size of IPOs, ownership structure, issue size and market capitalization of the firm's. However, we also draw a trend line for mean value. multiple linear regression results (see Table 3 ), it was clear that ssed against the level of underpr elationship betw
Descriptive Statistics
Multiple Regression Analysis
Results & Discussions
Based on the the entire variables were regre icing. There is a significant r een IPO years (2006, 2009 & 2011) and the level of underpricing at 5% significance level (z-value = −1.79, −1.92 & 1.69). This examined that IPO year (2006, 2009) has an important negative effect on the level of underpricing. However, IPO year 2011 has a positive effect on the level of underpricing. Therefore, null hypothesis 1 is rejected in the case of the IPO year (2006, 2009 & 2011) . At the same time, null hypothesis 1 is accepted in the case of rest of the IPO years, which indicates that there is no significant link between IPO years and level of underpricing. It reveals that there is no relevant link between Indian promoters and degree of underpricing @ 5% significance level (z = 0.187). In addition, null hypothesis 2 is accepted. It examines no consequential association between institutional non promoters and level of underpricing @ 5% significance level (z = 0.541). There is no significant link between institutional non promoters and underpricing. Hence, null hypothesis 3 is accepted. There is no significant difference between non institutional non promoters with the degree of underpricing at 5% significant level (z = 0.785). Nevertheless, null hypothesis 4 is accepted. It founded for significant relation of the number of share offered with a level of underpricing at 5% significance level (z = 1.99). It communicates the positive link between numbers of share offered with the level of underpricing. Consequently, null hypothesis 5 is rejected. There is no significant relationship between firm's age and level of underpricing at 5% significance level (z = −0.70). Accordingly, null hypothesis 6 is acknowledged.
There is a significant association of issue size at the level of underpricing at 5% significance level (z = −3.98). It indicates the negative link with the level of underpricing. Notwithstanding, null hypothesis 7 is rejected. There is a significant relationship between market capitalization and level of underpricing at 5% significance level (z = 2.04). This indicates that market capitalization has a positive effect on the level of underpricing. Therefore, null hypothesis 8 is declined. Significant relationship between subscription and the level of underpricing at 5% significance level (6.00). It reveals the positive relation with the level of underpricing. Nevertheless, Null hypothesis 9 is rejected. There is a significant difference between book build mechanism and level of underpricing @ 5% significance level 
